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The works and the studies by Alasdair MacIntyre introduce, 
often, a presentation and a relecture of Aristotelian themes and 
ideas, placing itself in the same way (but not in the same 
direction) of the new contemporary interpretations on 
Aristotelian thought rise up in the 19th century1. However, the 
Scottish philosopher’s personal reading on Aristotle seems to 
be influenced in a meaningful way by the St. Thomas reading 
of the Stagirite’s philosophy2. Unlike the Heidegger’s 
interpretation on Aristotle, MacIntyre doesn’t fix on the problem 
of the return to the original and authentic reading of the ancient 
greek thought, cleaned by the medieval deposits, but he is 
concentrated on a sort of new (revised) Aristotelianism, that 
gives, especially in After Virtue (1981), to this old philosophy a 
new form and a new reading3. Insomuch as MacIntyre self-
defines his thought a Thomistic aristotelianism. But, is this 
really his philosophical position? Or is it more an Aristotelian 
thomism? 
 
I. 
In After Virtue, reading the path of the virtue's idea from 
Homer, differentiating this last one from the Aristotelian, 
MacIntyre writes that: 
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on Aristotles’account […] it is the telos of man as a 
species which determines what human qualities are 
virtues. We need to remember however that although 
Aristotle treats the acquisition and exercise of the virtues 
as means to an end, the relationship of means to end is 
internal and not external. I call a means internal to a 
given end when the end cannot be adequately 
characterized independently of a characterization of the 
means. So it is with the virtues and the telos which is the 
good life for man on Aristotle’s account.4 
MacIntyre, here, advises that the distinction between internal or 
external means to end is not findable in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, but it’s typically of the defence by St. 
Thomas of the virtue’s idea of St. Augustine5. But, continuing 
his analysis, MacIntyre affirms that the New Testament’s 
account, even if it’s different «in content» from the Aristotelian 
one, has «the same logical and conceptual structure as 
Aristotle’s account»6. In the exegesis of MacIntyre, both the 
philosophers, Aristotle and St. Thomas, want to propose the 
idea that, reading the virtue as a quality, the exercise of it 
allows to attain the human telos, that is, the good. For the 
contemporary thinker this is the theoretical reason that brings 
the Aquinas very close to the virtue’s idea of the Stagirite. But, 
following his argument, seems to pop up a problem. Indeed, 
MacIntyre, developing the examination of the human telos of 
the good, says: «the good for man is of course a supernatural 
and not only a natural good, but supernature redeems and 
completes nature», and he continues: «moreover the 
relationship of virtues as means to the end which is human 
incorporation in the divine kingdom of the age to come is 
internal and not external, just as Aristotle»7.  
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From an historical-philosophical viewpoint, this position is 
problematic because, as the recent critic noticed, the ideas of 
the God and of the Divine by the Greeks, during the age of 
Plato and Aristotle, were different from those of Christianity8, 
here, of St. Thomas. The ancient greek concept of religion, 
may be seen in the word pistis, that, in the context of the polis, 
doesn’t take on the meaning of a direct e personal relationship 
with the God, but it has a juridical significance. As it is possible 
to see in the Socrates’ vicissitudes, the religion, or, what it is 
better to call religiousness, is linked to the laws of the polis, so, 
if someone transgresses a religious law, will be try in a law 
action. Therefore, historically, is possible to say that the value 
and the strongness of the greek religiousness, are not derived 
by the value and the strongness of the God (least of all of a 
legislator God), but they are due to the value and the 
strongness of the polis and its legal regulations. Looking 
beyond this historical fact, from a philosophical point of view, 
the God of the Aristotelian metaphysic, or rather the noesis 
noeseos (read out of the Thomistic revival), the Immobile 
motor, expresses an idea very far away from a personal God, it 
is a sort of atmosphere, something that is in another world and 
it influences this world, but not something that is in everyman 
and it influences everything. To the other side, St. Thomas, 
leaving from Aristotle, talks about the God of the Christian 
tradition, after more than a millennium of theological (and 
philosophical) thought.  
In view of these considerations, it is important to stress that 
MacIntyre’s analysis refers to the issues exposed in the I Book 
of the Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle would deal with a 
divine good, that is the telos of the human virtue9. On one 
hand, is true that, for MacIntyre, in Aristotelian philosophy the 
good for the man is something, not only natural, but also 
supernatural, divine, however, on the other hand, this religious 
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dimension on the earth, for men, is guaranteed by the law of 
the polis. And, even if, is equally true that in the metaphysical 
perspective of Aristotle this good «completes nature», because 
it is the Uncaused Cause, the first motor, is more difficult to 
assert that this kind of good «redeems […] nature». Is it 
possible an idea of redemption in Aristotle’s philosophy? The 
same MacIntyre puts some reservations on that prospect 
when, in After virtue, relates to the John Lloyd Ackrill’s 
Aristotelian interpretation10. So, for the Greek philosopher the 
telos of the good life has its height in the contemplation, but, in 
the Aristotelian thought, the idea of contemplation «is still 
situated within an account of the good life as a whole in which 
a variety of human excellences have to be achieved at the 
various relevant stages»11. Therefore, MacIntyre continues: 
«this is why the notion of a final redemption of an almost 
entirely unregenerate life has no place in Aristotle’s scheme»12. 
First of all, it must be said that the reference to the concept of 
redemption, in both quotations, appears in the matter on 
Aristotelian human good and its connexion with the telos. 
Besides, it is important to point out that this idea, peculiar of 
Christianity and, here, of the Aquinas philosophy, even taken 
beyond the one of «final redemption»13, is not directly referable 
to the possible Aristotelian dichotomy between natural and 
supernatural. Indeed, the divine good of Aristotle, certainly 
completes nature in its supernatural pre-eminence, but plays 
unlikely the role of nature’s redeemer in its supernatural 
primacy.  
Furthermore the, viewed, idea of the «relationship of virtues 
as means to the end», that would be internal, is understood by 
MacIntyre like the «human incorporation in the divine kingdom 
of the age to come»14. But this point is not so instantly 
approvable, as the Scottish philosopher wants, if is it read «just 
as Aristotle»15. The Greek thinker, never deals with an 
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existence of a divine kingdom that will be in the future, or of an 
another divine world in which the man will be included. Even 
when he exposes, in the Metaphysics, his critical account on 
Plato’s world of ideas, he doesn’t think it like a future kingdom 
for the men, or for the virtuous, at most he has in the mind 
something like an ideal world in which there are the supreme 
forms of the ideas, and so, the pure virtues. In the light of this, 
is possible to notice that in the «parallelism» between Aristotle 
and New Testament, in wich the Aquinas would be the 
«synthesis», the MacIntyre’s reading of the Aristotelian idea of 
virtue is meaningfully moves on the side of the St. Thomas‘ 
thought16.      
II. 
Moving the attention from Aristotle to the Aquinas, in the 
Summa Theologiae, in the matter of natural and supernatural 
good, is written: 
non est conveniens quod Deus minus provideat his quos 
diligit ad supernaturale bonum habendum, quam 
creaturis quas diligit ad bonum naturale habendum. 
Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet ut non solum 
moveat eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis 
formas et virtutes quasdam, quae sunt principia actuum, 
ut secundum seipsas inclinentur ad huiusmodi motus. Et 
sic motus quibus a Deo moventur, fiunt creaturis 
connaturales et faciles; secundum illud Sap. VIII, et 
disponit omnia suaviter. Multo igitur magis illis quos 
movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale 
aeternum, infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates 
supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab 
ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum. Et 
sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est.17 
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As far as is it possible to think similar the Aristotelian issue to 
the Thomistic one, in the passage just now quoted, it seems to 
be clear that the whole speech has its foundation on the New 
Testament’s idea of grace. This concept regulates the 
relationship God-man, and, in the perspective of the good, it 
affirms the self participation of God to his goodness:  
 
et secundum huiusmodi boni differentiam, differens 
consideratur dilectio Dei ad creaturam. Una quidem 
communis, secundum quam diligit omnia quae sunt, ut 
dicitur Sap. XI; secundum quam esse naturale rebus 
creatis largitur. Alia autem est dilectio specialis, 
secundum quam trahit creaturam rationalem supra 
conditionem naturae, ad participationem divini boni. Et 
secundum hanc dilectionem dicitur aliquem diligere 
simpliciter, quia secundum hanc dilectionem vult Deus 
simpliciter creaturae bonum aeternum, quod est ipse.18  
The divine good here seen appears in a constitutive 
relationship with that kind of special love, the grace, that makes 
possibile the idea of a participation to and in this good. Human 
good and divine good are connected by a positive stretch that 
allows the man to aspire asymptotically to this divine good, of 
which he’s participated and participating. Although the idea of 
participation is alive in the ancient greek idea of methexis, the 
idea of a personal God that feels something like the love for 
«all the things that exist», instead, is a characteristic of the 
New Testament’s religion. After all, it seems to be meaningful, 
and it is no accident, that MacIntyre in After virtue, in the few 
lines devoted to the concept of grace (after the quotation of 
Aristotle in the context of modern philosophy) writes: «the 
contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-
could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos remains and the divine moral 
law is still a schoolmaster to remove us from the former state to 
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the latter, even if, only grace enables us to respond to and 
obey its precepts»19.  
Another confirmation of the influence of St. Thomas in the 
Aristotle’s reading by MacIntyre may be seen also in the 
explication of the Aristotelian sense of the eudaimonia 
(translated with «difficulty» as «blessedness, happiness, 
prosperity»20). Underlining the relationship between this status 
and the good for man, in the definition of this idea, he says 
that: «it is the state of being well and doing well in being well, of 
a man’s being well-favored himself and in relation to the 
divine»21. It is not so difficult to understand how much the last 
part of this sentence is referable to the Christian God and to 
His direct relationship with the man, expressing the never 
ending ambition of the human good to the divine one.  
III. 
Leaving for a moment After Virtue, in the Preface to the 
italian edition of Three rivals versions of moral enquiry, 
published in 1993, MacIntyre claims that who, like him, 
supports «le posizioni dell’aristotelismo contemporaneo nella 
sua versione tomistica», «deve perciò essere in grado di fare 
due cose»:  
essere capace di dare ragioni valide per giungere alla 
conclusione che all'interno della tradizione costituita dai 
dibattiti argomentativi che si estendono da Socrate 
attraverso Platone e Aristotele fino e oltre i grandi filosofi 
medievali e della rinascenza scolastica, è prorio questa 
versione dell'aristotelismo che si è mostrata capace di 
giustificazione razionale attraverso l'argomentazione 
dialettica 
and  
essere in grado di spiegare come e perché in tradizioni 
rivali, nelle quali alcuni dei criteri, concetti o 
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argomentazioni centrali dell'aristotelismo tomista 
vengono rifiutati, una conseguenza di quel rifiuto sia la 
sterilità o almeno l'incoerenza, o forse entrambe, riguardo 
ai problemi sorti all'interno di queste tradizioni, sterilità e 
incoerenza che si spiegano adeguatamente solo 
mediante le risorse che un aristotelico tomista può 
proporre.22   
 
 
 
 
 
In spite of MacIntyre’s self-declaration of Aristotelianism, in 
After Virtue, he criticizes the «metaphysical biology»23, that he 
finds in the Stagirite’s thought and that would be connected to 
the «Aristotle’s teleology»24: 
 
human beings, like the members of all other species, 
have a specific nature; and that they move by nature is 
such that they have certain aims and goals, such that 
they move by nature towards a specific telos. The good is 
defined in terms of their specific characteristics. Hence 
Aristotle’s ethics, expounded as he expounds it, 
presupposes his metaphysical biology.25  
 
This teleological inclination of the human βίος is seen by 
MacIntyre like a limitation for the Aristotelian position, to the 
extent that he opposes and proposes to replace and to cross 
this idea introducing a social-historical dimension, linked to the 
concept of polis26. In other words, he doesn’t think the telos like 
a purpose of the human βίος, but in terms of a common good 
of society. This view, probably inspired by Benjamin Franklin, 
directs MacIntyre toward a political critique to the aristocratic 
connotation of that (that he calls the) metaphysical biology by 
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Aristotle27. At this point is useful to notice that MacIntyre twenty 
five years later After Virtue, returning on this aspect, corrects 
and reinforces his own point of view on this social sphere of the 
good-common-telos resorting, again, to the Aquinas. The 
continual study on the Scholastic philosopher, indeed, would 
have suggested to MacIntyre that his idea of a social good, 
opposed to the Aristotelian one, proposing merely a theory of 
society, wouldn’t be an effective way until it would have been 
expressly founded on a metaphysics. Not foreseeing this basis, 
for MacIntyre, the same St. Thomas’ perspective is darkened, 
inasmuch it is not possible to point out a theory of society 
without considering the idea of a human teleology towards 
which men move on for their own nature. So -writes MacIntyre 
in the Prologue to the Third Edition After Virtue After a Quarter 
of a Century-: «I discovered that I had, without realizing it, 
presupposed the truth of something very close to the account 
of the concept of good that Aquinas gives in question 5 in the 
first part of the Summa Theologiae»28. From this point of view 
MacIntyre, once again, searches and finds refuge and support 
in St. Thomas’ philosophy, going back to the teleological 
dimension of the good for the humans; so, he reasserts not 
only his steady connexion with this thinker, but even more 
strengthens the thesis, here suggested, of his Aristotelian 
thomism. 
As a matter of fact, in view of the above, that his position 
appears more like an Aristotelian thomism than a Thomistic 
aristotelianism. Indeed, if is true that the analysis of Aristotle’s 
works made by MacIntyre is deeply and  steadily influenced by 
the lectio of the Aquinas, is not so for the interpretation of 
Thomistic philosophy, in which survives a christianized 
Aristotle. The consideration of this ancient thought doesn’t be 
never without the St. Thomas and New Testament outlook of a 
God that completes and redeems nature and infuses his grace. 
Under this sign, Aristotle’s philosophy is read  through the Neo-
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Scholastic concepts, compelling this origin of the thought, that 
is, also, and above all, a thought of the origin, in a way in which 
metaphysics and ethics are thinked in a system that 
understands the nature not on his own architecture, but in 
dependence relationship with a supernatural and transcendent 
force that is not the aristotelian noesis noeseos. Therefore, if it 
is true that the philosophy of MacIntyre is a revival of the 
thomism, seems to be certain, likewise, that his profession of 
aristotelism have to be read not in the sense of his self-
declaration of a Thomistic aristotelianism, but in the direction of 
an Aristotelian thomism, that seems to animate his thought 
from After Virtue. 
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superioribus patet. Unde manifestum est quod bonum et ens sunt 
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